District Court overrules SRO on determination of Statute of Limitations

C.B. v. PITTSFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (W.D.N.Y. 4-15-2010): Parents sought reimbursement for two years at a private school. The IHO denied the claim. The SRO affirmed the denial as did the District Court. The parents also sought additional services for the failure to provide a FAPE in the year prior to the unilateral placement. This claim had been dismissed by the IHO and SRO as being beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff parent sent an email in November 2005 complaining about the district's pace in implementing one aspect of the IEP. SRO Paul Kelly held that that triggered the accrual of the claim. The Court disagreed stating that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff sent an email in November 2005 complaining about the district's pace in implementing one aspect of the IEP does not support the conclusion that she knew about the injury of which she now complains.” Plaintiff alleged that the 2005-2006 IEP was deficient, because it did not provide "support for [EB's] deficits in executive functioning." Plaintiff maintained that she first became aware of such deficiency in March 2006. The Court found that the 2005-2006 claim for additional services accrued in March 2006 and that thus, the parents claim was timely filed.

Additional services claim remanded to IHO

SRO 08-074: In his case, the IHO found that the district had failed to provide the student with a FAPE and ordered the CSE to reconvene and to place the child in an appropriate residential setting. The IHO also made an award of additional services. SRO Paul Kelly reversed on the FAPE and placement issues. Kelly vacated the additional services award. He suggested that the parent had not adequately raised the issue, but rather than just reversing and dismissing, he remanded to the IHO for development of a record.

Is the SRO additional services doctrine dead?

P. v. Newington, 2nd Cir., decided October 9, 2008.

For a number of years, the New York SRO has distinguished between compensatory education services and additional services. Hopefully, this 2nd circuit decision will put an end to this rather silly distinction.
The Court reasoned that

The IDEA allows a hearing officer to fashion an appropriate remedy, and we have held compensatory education is an available option under the Act to make up for denial of a free and appropriate public education. Mrs. C. v.Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The remedy’s mandates in this case – that an inclusion consultant be retained for a year, requiring the school to keep Dr. Majure on for at least that long,and completion of an FBA – appropriately addressed the problems with the IEP, especially when considered in light of the fact that P. is now included in at least 80% of regular-classroom activities, in part due to Dr. Majure’s recommendations. See Parents of Student W. v. PuyallupSch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.”). We therefore see no infirmity in the hearing officer’s chosen remedy.