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Showing posts with label reverse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reverse. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

SDNY reverses SRO again on reimbursement claim

Eschenasy v. New York City Dept. of Educ., Slip Copy, 2009 WL 804120
S.D.N.Y.,2009: IHO found for the parent on this reimbursement claim for a private placement at the Elan School. SRO reversed in case number 06-077 finding that she was not emotionally disturbed despite the child’s history of social maladjustment, cutting behavior, lying, stealing, inappropriate sexual conduct, purging, and a variety of other serious behavioral and emotional problems. The SDNYdisagreed and reversed the SRO. Note that the SRO just recently decided the next chapter in this same case in SRO 08-099, again reversing an IHO determination of eligibility and an award of reimburement at the Elan School.

After finding that the child met two of the five categories in the definition of emotionally disturbed, the Court then determined that her symptoms had adversely affected educational performance. The Court highlighted that SRO Kelly had essentially mischaracterized the evidence in the record in concluding that the child’s emotional problems had not adversely impacted her educational performance stating:

Despite acknowledging testimony in the record that Ann failed several courses in high school, the SRO stated that there was no documentary evidence of failing grades nor was there any testimony from her teachers or any indication that she had been held back a grade. Based on this lack of evidence, the SRO found that Ann had not shown that her emotional problems adversely affected her educational performance.


The Court allowed a transcript as additional evidence reasoning that

the documents are relevant and useful to the analysis of whether Ann's emotional problems have affected her educational performance. This is especially true in light of the SRO's confusing statements about Ann's failing grades and his suggestion that there was insufficient documentary evidence that her school work had been adversely affected. In addition, this evidence directly contradicts defendants' argument that Ann has been able to obtain passing grades despite her emotional problems. I therefore conclude that the usefulness of these transcripts outweighs any procedural considerations weighing against their admission.

Finally, while ruling that the equities favored reimbursement, the equities weighed against an award of attorney fees because the parents were partially to blame for the district’s failure to conduct an evaluation and classroom observation prior to the unilateral placement.

Friday, February 6, 2009

SRO strikes down another reimbursement award

SRO 08-137: Congress granted parents to right to seek reimbursement for an appropriate private school placement when the public school fails to offer an appropriate program. SRO Paul Kelly continues to abort that right. Once again, an IHO awards reimbursement to a parent–this time for ABA services. Once again, in a case in which the NYC school district conceded that it had failed to offer the child a FAPE for the time period in question, SRO Paul Kelly reversed, highlighting a variety of evidentiary deficiencies and utterly disregarding the evidence in favor of the award. Will it never end.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

SRO reverses award of reimbursement again

SRO 08-140: This case is notable for the extent to which SRO Paul Kelly goes to excuse the infirmities on an IEP. When evaluating the appropriateness of the district recommended program, Kelly relies upon and almost always(perhaps always) credits what a district says it is doing and what it says it will do. Thus districts can almost always overcome the obvious infirmities in their programs through testimony at a hearing and they can know that even if an IHO discredits the testimony, Kelly will rely on it.

Here, the impartial hearing officer found that the district failed to offer an appropriate educational program to the child and ordered it to pay for their daughter's tuition costs at the Manhattan Children's Center (MCC) for the 2008-09 school year. The determination was, at least in part, based upon the district’s failure to conduct an FBA or develop a BIP for this autistic child. Not surprisingly, Paul Kelly reversed the IHO finding that there was “no persuasive evidence in the hearing record that the student demonstrated a need for either an FBA or a BIP” and that, essentially, the school could have and would have adequately addressed the child’s behavioral needs without an FBA or a BIP. Kelly then noted that “[e]ven if an FBA or BIP was required by State regulation in this instance, the district's failure to do so here did not, procedurally or substantively, rise to the level of a denial of a FAPE to the student.”

Caution to parent attorneys–Kelly pointed out the following in a footnote: “the impartial hearing officer's finding that the district failed to conduct an FBA or BIP and thus "failed to satisfy 'Prong I' of the Burlington/Carter test" (IHO Decision at p. 22), the impartial hearing officer did not determine whether the district's failure to do so impeded the student's right to a FAPE,
significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits”. It is imperative that IHOs make such findings and it is incumbent upon us to do our best to make sure that they do so.

Kelly then went on to excuse, inter alia, the district’s failure to adequately indicate how the child’s progress would be reported finding that information regarding the child’s progress would be readily available to the parents.

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

SDNY reverses SRO on reimbursement claim

T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist. (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007)

NOTE: This case was reversed by the 2nd Circuit on February 03, 2009 at 554 F.3d 247.

This case with a decision date of May 10, 2007, but just now publicly reported, is of major importance in New York State where the State Review Office has found against parents in the great majority of cases from 2006 to the present. In this case, the parent lost at hearing and at SRO(05-076). This is a must read for parent attorneys and autism advocates. In sum, the Court found that:

  1. the district had improperly predetermined the child’s placement

  2. the child was entitled to extended day services

  3. the IEP which failed to include any transitional provisions for at-home ABA services, was not reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive an educational benefit and deprived him of a FAPE.

The District had knowledge of the Child's difficulty with transitions, and the IEP containing no at-home ABA therapy failed to address the Child's individual needs. Examining the evidence of record and giving due weight to the proceedings below, the Court cannot conclude that the child was likely to make progress under a plan that would bluntly change his routine, and in which no at home ABA therapy was provided, despite his being accustomed for the prior years provided with 30-35 hours per week of at home ABA services, and under which program he made meaningful advances.

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Federal Court Reverses NY SRO Again

Parent placed the child at a private school and requested a hearing at which she sought reimbursement. IHO ordered reimbursement; SRO reversed in 06-088. The Court in Jennifer D. ex rel. Travis D. v. New York City Dept. of Educ.(550 F.Supp.2d 420, 432 (S.D.N.Y.,2008)) focused on the district’s failure to offer a program in the LRE. The Court found that the SRO decision was not due deference reasoning that:
the SRO's decision does not enumerate the relevant factors or engage in an analysis of whether the IEP provided for a placement in the least restrictive environment. Because the SRO did not make any findings on this issue, the decision of the SRO is not entitled to deference with respect to whether the recommended placement in a special school with a 12:1:1 staffing ratio, and the subsequent offer of placement at PS 370 satisfied this requirement. Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 418 F.Supp.2d 559, 562 (“[W]here there are no administrative findings on an issue germane to the court's determination, deference would be inappropriate.”), rev'd on other grounds, 489 F.3d 105.

Additionally, and importantly, in finding that the parent had established the appropriateness of the unilateral placement, the Court distinguished its holding from Gagliardo II as follows:

The defendant relies heavily on the recent decision in Gagliardo II in support of its argument that the plaintiff's placement was not appropriate. In Gagliardo II, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment that had granted reimbursement, finding that the district court erred in concluding that the unilateral placement at issue was appropriate. However, in that case the court was addressing an administrative record where “the IHO, confronted with the same evidence, found that [the unilateral placement] was not an appropriate placement,” and the SRO had affirmed the IHO decision. Gagliargo II, 489 F.3d at 113. The court found that the district court had improperly afforded the IHO's findings no weight, particularly in light of the fact that the SRO noted that the IHO's findings were supported by the record. Id. at 114 n. 2. The court found that the IHO's finding was reasoned and supported by the record and therefore reversed the district court's judgment ordering reimbursement. Id. at 114. In contrast, in this case the IHO found that the unilateral placement was appropriate, and the SRO made no findings on this issue. This Court has given due weight to the findings of the state administrative officers, and based on its review of the record agrees with the determination of the IHO that the placement in the Legacy Program was appropriate. Therefore, unlike in Gagliardo II, this Court does not reach a different conclusion from the state administrative officers on the issue of whether the private placement was appropriate.