Pendency does not absolve the district of obligation to develop IEP

SRO 08-026: SRO found that district was not relieved of its obligation to develop an IEP during the course of hearing. SRO Paul Kelly rejected the district's contention that it did not have to develop an IEP for the student because he was receiving services through pendency. Kelly noted that “[c]onducting CSE meetings and formulating and offering new IEPs during the course of pending litigation is not prohibited under the IDEA provided that there is adherence to pendency requirements (Letter to Watson, 48 IDELR 284 [OSEP 2007]; see Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 07-122).”

Mootness, effect of subsequently issued IEP, pendency, comp ed, attorney fees

Student X, by his mother v. NYC Dept. of Educ., Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4890440(E.D.N.Y. Oct 30, 2008) (NO. 07-CV-2316(NGG)RER): The parent in this case lost on the FAPE claims but the case is extremely important for a variety of reasons. First, the Court dealt what hopefully is a knockout blow to SRO Paul Kelly’s overly restrictive view of the mootness doctrine. The Court found that an IEP issued subsequent to the challenged IEP did not moot the challenge to the first IEP. The Court recognized that the challenged action was capable of repitition while evading review. Next, the Court cited to the 2nd Circuit Schutz case observing that “a new IEP for the school year following the one at issue in the litigation was a “mere proposal” that did not change the student's pendency entitlement. To hold otherwise would “undermine entirely the pendency placement provisions of the IDEA, allowing a school district to avoid altogether § 1415(j)”. Again, this is a refutation of SRO Paul Kelly who has repeatedly excused district malfeasance by denying the parent the right to due process when a district issues a new IEP.

And there’s more. Citing to the recent 2nd Cir. case P. v. Newington, the Court refuted the notion that compensatory education is limited to over age 21. This should help to reinforce that the SRO’s silly distinction between “additional services” and compensatory education should be relegated to historical artifact. The Court then found that the refusal to implement pendency was a gross violation of the IDEA for which the Court granted an hour for hour award of compensatory services. Finally, the Court awarded attorney fees to the parent for prevailing on pendency.

Pendency when a child is transitioning from preschool to Kindergarden

It is not unusual for a school district to radically reduce a child’s services or even declassify the child upon entering kindergarden. For a child who has been receiving services as a preschooler, the parent can request a hearing and assert the right to pendency. The SRO in appeal number 01-023 stated that

[t]he pendency provisions apply even when a child is transitioning from preschool to a school-age program (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 96-48; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 00-037; Application of a Disability, Appeal No. 01-003). Pendency protects against a unilateral change in a child’s placement, such as a material alteration of a student’s educational program. It does not mean that a child must remain in a particular site or location (Application of the Board of Educ., Appeal No. 99-90), or at a particular grade level (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 95-16). Pendency has the effect of an automatic injunction, which is imposed without regard to such factors as irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of the hardships (Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F. 2d at 904 [2d Cir. 1982]; Drinker v. Colonial School District, 78 F. 3d 859 [3d Cir. 1996]).

Note that this does not mean that the child must remain in the preschool program, but rather that the district is obligated to continue the program prescribed in the IEP in a school age environment. If the child is school age eligible, but not of compulsory school age, the child may be able to continue in the preschool environment if the program is certified for school age kids.

Responsibility for implementation of the IEP

Oftentimes, school personnel are oblivious to the specifics in a child’s IEP. Sometimes, school personnel are not even aware that a child has an IEP. This is an unacceptable practice. New York State regulations require that “the chairperson of the committee on special education designates for each student one, or as appropriate, more than one professional employee of the school district with knowledge of the student’s disability and education program to, prior to the implementation of the IEP, inform each regular education teacher, special education teacher, related service provider, other service provider, supplementary school personnel, as defined in section 200.1(hh) of this Part, and other provider and support staff person of his or her responsibility to implement the recommendations on a student’s IEP, including the responsibility to provide specific accommodations, program modifications, supports and/or services for the student in accordance with the IEP”(8 NYCRR §200.2(b)(11)(iii); see also $200.4(e)(3)).

EXTENDED SCHOOL YEAR PROGRAMS AND SERVICES in New York State

See here for state ed Q and A document on extended school year(i.e. summer) programs.

Failure to include transition plan for child in residential placement renders district program inappropriate

The district knew that this autistic child had difficulty with major transition plans, yet it merely promised to develop a plan if the parents agreed to the district placement. In A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley School District(2008 WL 2704626, M.D.Pa. 2008), the court said that that was not enough. “When a school district knows that a child requires a transition plan to return to that district from a private school placement and that school district does not include a transition plan in the IEP, the IEP is not appropriate.”