Court reverses SRO denial of reimbursement claim and holds that late notice warrants reduction rather than denial

WOOD v. KINGSTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT (N.D.N.Y. 9-29-2010): Parent placed child at the Kildonan School and sought tuition reimbursement. Parent prevailed at hearing. SRO reversed on the equities finding that the parent’s notice to the District of their dissatisfaction with the IEP and intent to enroll the child in Kildonan was untimely. The District Court held that the fact that the parent had provided notice of intent to make a reimbursement claim 5, rather than 10, business days prior to the start of the school year at Kildonan, warranted a 10% reduction in the award of reimbursement rather than denial of reimbursement.

Update on New York State Review Office situation

I was just advised by the Office of State Review that a replacement for the recently departed Paul Kelly has not yet been named and that in the interim, Frank Munoz, Robert Bentley and Joseph Frey will act as State Review Officers.

School district can not recoup pendency payments

Atlanta v. SF : In this case decided in September 2010, a Georgia court held “that parents of a child awarded private educational services because the IEP offered by the school was deemed to be inappropriate are not required to reimburse the school district for that expenditure, even if the administrative decision is later reversed.” This decision contains an overview of case law addressing this issue from other courts around the country. It is of particular interest here in New York as the New York City Board of Education has made repeated attempts to recoup pendency payments.

New York State Review Officer resigns

Reliable sources have advised that SRO Paul Kelly, the subject of much controversy over the last 4 or 5 years, has resigned and that today is his last day in office. No word yet on a replacement.

SRO awards reimbursement for private placement

SRO 10-050: The parent rejected the district recommended program, placed the child in a private school and sought reimbursement. The IHO ruled in favor of the school district finding that the parents failed to demonstrate that the June 2009 IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide the student with a FAPE. The SRO found that the IHO had improperly shifted the burden of proof to the parents and that that was grounds for annulling the decision. He went on, however, to analyze the merits and he determined that the district had failed to offer a FAPE, that the parental placement was appropriate and that the equities weighed in favor of the parent.

Court refuses to compel district to pay for pendency placement

M.M. v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (S.D.N.Y. 7-27-2010): Parent placed child in private school for the 2008-2009 school year and made a reimbursement claim. Parent had already prevailed at hearing on a reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school. The district did not appeal that decision. Thus, the parent asserted in her hearing request for 08-09 that pendency was the private school placement. The district did not contest the parent’s right to pendency reimbursement. On day one of the hearing, the DOE again did not object to the parent’s pendency request. During the hearing, the parent sought a pendency order from IHO Esther Mora. Mora noted the request but never issued an order requiring the NYCDOE to provide the parents with pendency reimbursement. Mora ultimately ruled against the parents on the reimbursement claim and further stated that "I have examined the
parties remaining contentions and find that it is unnecessary to reach them for the reason set forth above or because they are not disputed issues." The parents did not appeal the decision.

The DOE then refused to pay for the pendency placement. The parents sought payment in federal court and remarkably, the Court ruled against the parents, reasoning that the parents had not exhausted the administrative process by not appealing Mora’s failure to rule on pendency to the SRO.

This is a very harsh ruling and arguably, a gross miscarriage of justice. A party can only appeal if aggrieved by a ruling. The IHO did not rule on the pendency issue because it was not contested. The parties were in agreement as to pendency. Yet, the Court held that the parents were foreclosed from recovering due to the failure to appeal the Mora non-ruling. Bottom line, the parents don’t get paid for the pendency placment even though the district agreed with them before and during the hearing that they should get paid.

Prevailing party status for IEE

AP v. NORTHERN BURLINGTON COUNTY REGIONAL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Dist. Court, D. New Jersey 2010: District Court held that Parents who obtained an order compelling a district to pay for an Independent Educational Evaluation were entitled to prevailing party status for purposes of an attorney fee claim.

Court allows parent to proceed on behalf of child

B.J.S. v. STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (W.D.N.Y. 2-9-2010): Parent appealed the SRO’s denial of her claim that her child’s IEP was inappropriate. She proceeded pro se and brought the claim “individually and on behalf” of her child. The school district sought to have counsel appointed for the child. The Court denied the motion reasoning that the child was not an individual plaintiff in the action. Rather, the parent, who has a right to proceed pro se pursuant to Winkelman, was asserting her own IDEA rights, rights that are “coextensive” with the child’s rights. Thus, the parent was suing to enforce the parent’s individual right to a FAPE for her child.

This case also presents an interesting discussion about confidentiality, the sealing of records and the proper captioning of IDEA cases to preserve the privacy of the child.

SRO annuls inadequate decision and remands for further testimony

SRO 10-035: Parent sought reimbursement for a private school placement. The IHO denied the parent’s claim in a 5 paragraph decision that violated virtually every norm for a hearing officer’s decision. The SRO agreed with the parent’s arguments regarding the inadequacy of the decision. Additionally, this IHO had refused to adjourn the hearing for the taking of testimony of a district witness. The SRO found that to be error. The SRO remanded the matter to the same hearing officer for further testimony and consideration.

SRO affirms award for private school reimbursement

SRO 10-042: Parents prevailed at hearing in New York City private school reimbursement case. NYC appealed to the SRO. For the first time this year, the SRO affirmed on the merits a decision in which an IHO had awarded reimbursement to a parent. The IHO on the case was James Walsh.

Graduation is not necessarily the end of the story

Doe v. MARLBOROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Dist. Court, D. Massachusetts 2010:

Reimbursement and compensatory education cases live on after a child graduates. This case takes it one step further. Child had an IEP and received special education services. Parent challenged the legitimacy of the child’s graduation. The Court ruled that satisfaction of graduation requirements does not necessarily terminate a school district’s obligations under the IDEA. “ [A] school district may not properly graduate a student with disabilities if the student was not provided with FAPE as required by IDEA (e.g., a student did not receive appropriate transitional services or his IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit).” Pendency during such a challenge is the placement and program that the child was in at the time of the challenge.

Another decision in which the Court rejects district effort to save deficient IEP through testimony at hearing

N.S. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (D.C. 5-4-2010): It is utterly remarkable what some parents must go through these days to get an appropriate program for their child. In this case, the parents rejected the district’s proposed IEP, placed their child privately and requested reimbursement. The IHO ruled in favor of the school district despite the that, inter alia, the IEP did not include a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and performance, it was undisputed that the child required a multitude of supplementary aids and services in the classroom and the IEP failed to identify any such aids and services, the IEP failed to include specific goals and objectives to address the child's significant deficits in written language, the IEP failed to contain speech and language goals despite evidentiary support for the need, the IEP failed to include OT services despite the documented need and subsequent OT evaluation recommending services in response to which the district did not amend the IEP, and the IEP recommended inclusion despite the need for pullout services.

The IHO ruled in favor of the district reasoning that because the parents pulled the child prior to the implementation of the proposed IEP, the parents concerns were “speculative.” The Court rejected this position reasoning that “parents are not required to wait and see a proposed IEP in action before concluding that it is inadequate and choosing to enroll their child in an appropriate private school.” The district argued that the alleged defects were “merely procedural or technical and that they did not deprive N.S. or his parents of any substantive rights under the IDEA.” The Court rejected this argument and distinguished between harmless procedural flaws such as “failures to meet statutory deadlines” from serious procedural flaws such as here–“failures to include required information in an IEP about the services to be provided a disabled student.” The district argued that “as long as [the proposed placement] was "willing and able" to provide N.S. with appropriate services to meet his educational needs, any errors or deficiencies in the IEP are harmless.” The Court soundly rejected that argument reasoning that “the IDEA requires that a school district do more than simply provide services adequate to meet the needs of disabled students; it requires school districts to involve parents in the creation of individualized education programs tailored to address the specific needs of each disabled student…The IEP must be specific enough to allow parents to understand what services will be provided and make a determination about whether the proposed placement is adequate.” The IHO further erred by relying “on evidence about what services could have been provided by … instead of considering what services were actually called for by the IEP or adequately discussed at the IEP meeting. Because the purpose of the due process hearing is to contest the adequacy of the IEP and the placement, the Hearing Officer should not consider evidence about services not prescribed by the IEP or discussed at the IEP meeting.”

New York attorneys should take note of this decision as the SRO routinely permits school districts to cure significant defects in IEPS through testimony at hearing.

Supreme Court denies cert in 11 special education cases

The Supreme Court denied cert in 11 special education cases during the 2009 term including 3 cases from the 2nd Circuit: E.H. and K.H. v. Shenendehowa, T.Y. and K.Y. v. NYC Board of Ed. and Levine v. Greece (links are to the 2nd Circuit cases).

District Court rejects school district attempt to remedy deficient IEP through testimony at hearing

DUMONT BOARD OF EDUCATION v. J.T. (N.J. 5-10-2010): The New York State Review Office (SRO) often excuses inadequate IEPS by crediting the impartial hearing testimony of school district personnel as to what the district would have done for a child. Thus, district personnel have been able to, in effect, supplement an IEP and remedy its defects at hearing. In this New Jersey case, the Court refused to countenance such a tactic noting that

[w]ith respect to the sensory diet or sensory program, Dumont asserts that any deficiency in the IEP was obviated by testimony at trial that Tri-Valley would provide an adequate sensory
program for I.T.'s needs. (Def. Br. at 17.) Under the IDEA, however, "in determining whether an IEP was appropriate, the focus should be on the IEP actually offered and not on one that the school board could have provided if it had been so inclined." Lascari v. Board of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1189 (N.J. 1989). See also D.C. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-2851, 2005 WL 1229827, at *2 (D.N.J. 2005) (quoting Lascari). Whether or not Dumont would have offered I.T. additional sensory education services at a later date, the substance of the IEP with regard to her sensory education was limited to "sensory activities, tickles, hugging, deep pressure, physical touch," without any indication the numerous sensory stimulation techniques used at Tri-Valley and discussed in Dumont's brief, or any detailed program or reference to I.T.'s home sensory diet.

Pendency in charter school case

ELYSIAN CHARTER SCHOOL v. BAYONNE BD. OF ED., 09-3741 (3rd Cir. 6-10-2010): This is an interesting case out of New Jersey. Parents placed their child in a charter school outside their school district. Charter schools in New Jersey have administrative control over the special education process. The charter school is responsible for development and implementation of the IEP. The charter school recommended placement in a private school for the following school year and the parents agreed. The home school district objected and requested a hearing, maintaining that they could offer the child a FAPE. The parents asserted that pendency was the private school arguing alternatively that it was the current educational placement and that they and the school (i.e. the charter school) had agreed to the placement. The Third Circuit disagreed and held that the child’s pendency placement was the charter school, the last school the child had actually attended at the time the hearing request had been submitted. The Third Circuit also reasoned that to allow the parents and the charter school to agree on the child’s pendency placement would conflict with the home district’s right under New Jersey law to object to the private school placement recommendation.